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AB–For the past few years the Information Systems (IS) 
academic community has started to attend to its history and 
development. In terms of elapsed time, the period in ques-
tion is very short – around 70 years, starting from the 1950s 
– but in terms of what this encompasses, it is substantial 
and momentous. Moreover, we are fortunate in being able 
to learn directly from several key figures who were involved 
from the beginning; who can offer first-hand interpreta-
tions. The number of accounts and other expositions has 
increased in the past few years, resulting in a varied and 
valuable resource for all concerned. Yet it is important to 
recognize that developing a history of IS cannot simply 
consist of piling up the data as an edifice recording previ-
ous accomplishments. IS academics and practitioners 
should certainly understand that insights do not arise merely 
from gathering ‘Big Historical Data’ and targeting it with 
complex analytics, leading to some ever more supposedly 
accurate account of the past. Expertise and acumen are 
required, and even these outcomes are never definitive, fin-
ished or complete; instead, they provide points in a network 
of accounts, sometimes conflicting, that themselves become 
resources for later work.
In 2013, the Journal of Information Technology (JIT) 
published a series of papers on IS history, across two edi-
tions (see Bryant et al., 2013a, 2013b). In the editorial essay 
to the first of these, we were at pains to challenge (1) any 
idea that there is a unique and distinctive ‘historical method’; 
(2) that history could be understood as some linear process 
leading inexorably to the present. In so doing, we referred to 
the work of Michel Foucault. In his early works, such as 
Madness and Civilization, and The Birth of the Clinic 
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(Foucault, 1967, 1976), he sought to stress the discontinui-
ties that arise when investigating topics such as the history 
of madness, or practices of medical confinement. In many 
instances seeking to show that what for us in the present is 
regarded as ‘necessary’ and ‘essential’, was actually often 
regarded as contingent for our predecessors – and vice 
versa. Studying history then becomes an activity of seeking 
to discover ‘the other’, and thereby to confront ourselves.
Much as we may wish to look back on the past as some-
thing potentially familiar, Foucault stresses that we should 
be prepared to be shocked by its strangeness, which in turn 
should make us confront the present in a similar manner. 
This then invites the converse; what at first sight appears 
strange and unfamiliar, turns out on inspection to have a 
close affinity with some present phenomenon. For exam-
ple, we might note that the role of the adjutant in military 
history has a bearing on our understanding of today’s high-
tech decision support systems. Similarly, aspects of the von 
Neumann architecture and the basic structure of computer 
programming owe a good deal to the concept of the divi-
sion of labour – vertical and horizontal – that influenced 
Babbage in the 19th century.
Foucault used the term ‘archaeology’ in these works, 
stressing the structural aspects of history, while undermin-
ing the idea of the primacy of the individual or some form 
of historical consciousness or teleology. In his later work, 
he enhanced this archaeological allegory with what he saw 
as a genealogical one, explicitly using this term in the same 
way, and as homage to, Nietzsche’s (1984) work on The 
Genealogy of Morals. If the archaeological perspective 
involves enquiring into the structural aspects, the genea-
logical one encourages us to focus on the accidental and 
contingent nature of developments.
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an 
unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of 
forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past 
actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to 
animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on 
all its vicissitudes. . . . On the contrary, to follow the complex 
course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper 
dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute 
deviations-or conversely, the complete reversals-the errors, 
the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth 
to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is 
to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what 
we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. 
(Foucault, 1984: 81, emphasis added)
The metaphor of genealogy leads to a consideration of 
whether there are inherited organizational and cultural fac-
tors that stimulate or inhibit such developments and contin-
gencies. Perhaps there are organizational structures from 
which innovations relating to information and communica-
tion systems are more likely to emerge? Lyons and Co may 
be one such example, as we discuss below; this is a topic to 
which we return in our concluding section.
Whether one agrees with and follows Foucault’s reason-
ing, the history of IS can be regarded as a palimpsest, where 
the most recent or fashionable technological ideas and arte-
facts overlay all that went before, largely obscuring their 
predecessors and blind alleys: In some cases, masking 
important insights and understandings that need to be re-
discovered and brought back to our attention. Re-constructing 
this history is then complex, open to contestation and always 
incomplete, owing as much to the person or persons doing 
the re-construction as to the material itself. This is not to 
undermine or diminish such efforts. On the contrary, it is 
crucial to gather as many re-constructions as possible as a 
basis upon which to build and enhance our understanding, 
of what went before, where we are now and what we have 
achieved: Also where we could and should be going.
In the light of this, what follows offers an important con-
tribution to the archaeology of information systems, both in 
practice as an academic domain or discipline, and a focus 
on the genealogy of the field, including some of the acci-
dents and deviations that marked later developments. It is 
derived from a series of conversations and later exchanges 
that I arranged with Frank Land. The substantive aspects 
date from the late 2017 and were then developed in a series 
of exchanges in 2018; although in effect he and I have been 
developing this conversation over many years, during 
which he has been continually challenging, expansive and 
forthcoming.
Comments forthcoming from readers of earlier drafts 
indicated some perplexity regarding the genre and the objec-
tives of our contribution, so it is important to note that the 
term ‘conversation’ is something of a conceit. It is not an 
interview per se, nor is it a biographical account. The core of 
what follows developed from our verbatim exchanges both 
face-to-face, and later via email. Some sections, however, 
have been reworked and enhanced to clarify and augment 
the issues raised. In addition, we have sought to provide a 
good deal of background and narrative to guide readers 
through the text, offering pointers to further resources. The 
overall contribution is intended to provide an informed and, 
we hope, informative contribution to people’s understand-
ing of key social and technical issues of our time.
The ‘conversation’ really started in the 1990s when 
Frank Land, by then retired, accepted a position to join me 
as a visiting professor at what was then Leeds Metropolitan 
University (now Leeds Beckett University). In our discus-
sions, we found we shared many ideas, but at the same time 
learned from each other. We collaborated in several joint 
papers, and I asked Frank to write an introduction to my 
book Thinking Informatically (Bryant, 2006). From this 
collaboration emerged the idea that the wealth of experi-
ence Frank had gained, together with our varied back-
grounds and understandings of the Information Systems 
discipline, could provide both a historical view of the evo-
lution of IS and a platform for further insights and consid-
erations regarding the directions in which the discipline and 
associated practices could or should develop.
Bryant and Land 3
Frank and I view neutrality and impartiality as unwel-
come and unachievable in such endeavours. Consequently, 
in what follows we offer a deliberately personalized and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the period and key events, 
supplemented throughout with annotations, asides and sug-
gestions for further reading and investigation.
We have tried to cater for a wide-ranging readership. For 
some of our contemporaries (60+), the ‘conversation’ will 
probably elicit additional and perhaps competing recollec-
tions and observations, providing the basis perhaps for 
future contributions to JIT. For others, both IS academics 
and practitioners, we trust that we can add something to 
their understanding of the characteristics of and challenges 
faced by those involved in the early years of commercial 
computing and academic IS. Given the sweep across sev-
eral decades, and the range of issues encompassed by our 
transdisciplinary discussion, it is inevitable that many read-
ers may feel that too much has been assumed on our part. 
Again, this was pointed out by some reviewers. We have 
responded to this by adding footnotes and explanatory sec-
tions where relevant, together with suggestions for further 
reading, a time-line, and list of key figures. We also address 
some aspects of the historical background of the period.
Yet the readership of any journal, however specialized, 
is always heterogeneous, and JIT is no different. Indeed, 
there is good reason to claim that its audience is drawn 
from many disciplines and interest groups, with varying 
forms of expertise, skills and backgrounds. Accordingly, 
some readers may find our additional points useful, while 
others find them irksome or under-developed. On the 
other hand, I doubt that many will have come across the 
work of Günther Anders, so at the very least one of our 
contributions will be to introduce this important but 
neglected writer to a community for whom his work is 
particularly relevant.
The result of all this is a lengthy submission, now pub-
lished across two issues. Fortunately, the material lends 
itself readily to this bifurcation. Part 1 covers the earliest 
period of commercial computing and LEO in particular. 
Part 2 focuses initially on the development of Academic IS 
in the United Kingdom, and then moves on to more recent 
issues. Arriving at this point has involved extensive discus-
sion of all concerned, and we are grateful to the editors of 
JIT for their support and guidance in the process of devel-
oping this extended contribution and bringing it to 
publication.
Frank Land is a unique figure in this context, combining 
a key role in the earliest days of commercial computing 
through his involvement in the ground-breaking business 
computer system with LEO computers in the 1950s, with 
his later pioneering of Academic IS, including developing 
some of the earliest Information Systems courses and 
research programmes at university level.1 Now in his nine-
ties, his efforts continue unabated as he engages with cur-
rent developments in both areas, offering challenging 
insights derived from his extensive experiences. Since the 
late 1990s he has made many contributions describing 
aspects of these experiences (see for instance Land, 2008, 
2010, 2015). Thus, when we started to develop and report 
on our recent conversation one priority was to position his 
knowledge and insights against current concerns; albeit 
after expanding upon his involvement with the LEO pro-
ject, and his influential role in introducing and developing 
academic programmes in IS, initially in the United 
Kingdom, later internationally. This article should be 
understood as a contribution to the oral history of IS, giving 
voice to Frank Land’s unique experiences and insights.
Interjection from FL: But the contribution is more than 
an oral history. As a ‘conversation’ its value depends on the 
contribution of both parties. The erudition, lateral thinking 
and understanding of Tony Bryant ensures that the story 
provides far more than a set of recollections, and provides 
the basis for readers to think more deeply about the nature 
and scope of IS.
The recollections and discussion that follow are open to 
supplementary and differing contributions from others, 
either derived from overlapping experiences or from schol-
arly or other forms of research and archive-based analysis, 
or both.2
Frank and I are both conscious of the ways in which 
‘narratives’ can appear to be hermetically sealed accounts, 
closing off alternatives; but in fact this is never the case, 
and certainly is not the case in this context. In preparing and 
in reading accounts such as this we all need to be aware of 
The Rashomon effect.
The term derives from the film Rashomon, in which a 
murder is described by four witnesses in four entirely con-
tradictory ways. The Simpsons offers a powerful and suc-
cinct summation.
Marge: Come on, Homer. Japan will be fun! You liked 
Rashomon.
Homer: That’s not how I remember it!3
The key then is to encourage others to offer their own 
alternative accounts of these developments, contributing to 
a dialogue aimed not at completion and closure, but at par-
ticipation and a widening of perspectives and enhanced 
understanding. Frank’s account needs to be understood as 
offering one component part of the developing re-construc-
tion of the history of IS.
FL–That re-construction is grounded in the recollection 
of the circumstances – personal, cultural and economic – 
prevailing throughout that period. My own story starts with 
the experience of a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany 
arriving in London in 1939, being evacuated (happily) to 
escape the Blitz, returning to London and Grammar School, 
followed by study at the London School of Economics 
(LSE), and seeking a career first in academia but quickly 
followed by employment by J. Lyons & Co. Starting work 
as a clerk in the offices of Lyons made me aware of the 
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difference between actual work practice, with its everyday 
work-arounds, against the idealised practice of the rule 
book, and the often deliberate time inflation of jobs permit-
ting my colleagues to complete tasks when unexpected 
problems arose. Later joining the LEO (Lyons Electronic 
Office) team, I became acutely conscious of the confidence 
people had in the ability of managers at Lyons to tackle any 
problems. Yet at that time I was totally unaware of the role 
computers had played in winning the war, or indeed what 
the impact of computing technology was to have in trans-
forming so many aspects of everyday life.
AB–By the early 1950s the euphoria in the immediate 
aftermath of the end of World War II had dissipated, and a 
deeper and more troublesome reckoning had started to be 
articulated. The enormous costs of the war and re-establish-
ing the peace were becoming more apparent, and it was 
clear to many – but not all – that the UK was entering a 
period of decline, while the USA was making giant strides 
in all directions, particularly various forms of technological 
innovation. The prime example, of course, was the use of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to 
severe questioning of the effects of technological advances 
and discussion of their use and abuse. The role of comput-
ers in the Allied victory, as Frank notes, was largely 
unknown, except to the few who had been involved at 
Bletchley Park and other similar centres in the USA.
Exemplifying Foucault’s concept of genealogy, Lyons 
and Co benefitted from a series of accidents and contingen-
cies that led to the development of the LEO computer. A 
number of their senior employees had been part of the war 
effort, involved in developing new technologies, particu-
larly radar; also, the management of a munitions factory. 
Once demobilized they returned to work and found that 
Lyons was extremely fertile ground for thinking about 
ways in which their business could benefit from techno-
logical innovation. As Frank explains below, George Booth 
and John Simmons had already laid the foundation for this 
in the 1920s and 1930s, taking up the concept of Scientific 
Management promulgated at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury by Frederick Taylor, but integrating it with the Lyons 
philosophy of a family company.
These developments took place against a background of 
the rediscovery or renewed understanding of what are now 
regarded as some of the classic writings on organization by 
earlier writers such as Chester Barnard and Henri Fayol. 
This was in no small way due to the Marshall Plan, the 
US-backed scheme to rebuild Europe in the wake of World 
War II (WWII). The scheme was funded by US$12 billion 
in the late 1940s – more than US$100 billion in 2019 values 
– and necessitated new ideas about management and coor-
dination. Key innovations were developed in the writings 
of Herbert Simon, W Ross Ashby, Norbert Wiener and oth-
ers, focusing on organizational design and development, 
decision-making and systems approaches. A related trend 
emanated from the writing of Peter Drucker, regarded as 
the father of modern management theory.
In the same period, an alternative or complementary 
‘socio-technical’ tradition was developing, primarily asso-
ciated with the Tavistock Institute for Human Relations 
(TIHR) in London. Founded in 1947, the TIHR sought the
study of human relations for the purpose of bettering working 
life and conditions for all humans within their organisations, 
communities and broader societies and to the influence of 
environment in all its aspects on the formation or development 
of human character or capacity.
The institute developed from the Tavistock Clinic, founded 
in the immediate aftermath of World War I (WWI) for the 
treatment of soldiers suffering from shell-shock and other 
disorders that would now be categorized as post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). The clinic specialized in preventive 
psychiatry, expertise in group relations – including army 
officer selection – social psychiatry and action research. A 
driving force was the post war need to modernize British 
industry and in particular to invest in technology. The TIHR 
with Fred Emery, Ken Bamforth and Eric Trist at the helm 
took up the challenge, and their early papers articulated the 
concept of ‘socio-technical systems’ exemplified by Eric 
Trist and K. Bamforth (1951). This was later developed in 
particular by Enid Mumford, a key influence on and col-
laborator with Frank Land (see below).
The tradition built on earlier work, particularly that of 
Mary Parker Follett, an American whose work was influen-
tial on writers such as Chester Barnard, and later on the 
development of the Human Relations School of organiza-
tion design, including the work of Argyris, Lewin, 
McGregor and Maslow.4
This is an example of the palimpsest of IS history, in this 
case concerning the work of various theorists and practition-
ers studying the actual working experiences of those involved 
in new technologies from a systemic perspective. Something 
that was rediscovered in a later period, but which was better 
understood and more highly developed in Europe than in the 
United States. Thus, the socio-technical ideas referred to 
above found a receptive audience in many parts of Europe 
both in academia and in practice. These ideas have always 
been present in some form, but all too easily effaced or 
treated as nugatory, with preference given to more mechanis-
tic and hierarchical concepts and assumptions.
At this point, offering much more detail regarding the 
context from which LEO and related technologies devel-
oped would take us far beyond the scope of this conversa-
tion. We have given a few indications of key issues and 
trends, and trust that these suffice for the moment. But it is 
important to note the succinct and provocative position 
taken by Joe Weizenbaum (1984) that ‘the remaking of the 
world in the image of the computer started long before 
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there were any electronic computers’ (p. ix). (We return to 
this in our concluding section.)
The discussion that follows highlights and addresses 
current issues concerning academic IS, developments in 
ICT and more generally what might be termed ‘social infor-
matics’ – or simply ‘informatics’ in the sense used by many 
of us before the computer scientists decided to take up the 
term in their efforts to re-brand themselves! (See Bryant, 
2006). We also incorporate consideration of ‘The Dark Side 
of ICT’, a term we introduced in the late 1990s, encompass-
ing ethical issues as well as critical consideration of the 
ways in which Academic IS is often far too closely associ-
ated with and uncritical of neo-liberal corporate behaviour 
and assumptions – for example, accepting share-holder 
value as the principal touchstone of success.
Lyons and LEO
AB–Your earliest work in the area of IT and computers 
was on the LEO project in the 1950s. It is now widely rec-
ognized that LEO – Lyons Electronic Office – was the first 
commercial computer in the world, although it still comes 
as a surprise to many people who assume that the USA was 
always at the forefront of this technology. The LEO group 
has made significant contributions over the years (e.g. 
Caminer et al., 1998; Mason, 2004; Simmons, 1962), and 
there is a growing and fairly extensive literature on the 
topic, including Georgina Ferry’s highly readable book 
(Ferry, 2003). And now we also have ‘The Information Age 
Gallery’ exhibit at The Science Museum in London. In fact, 
it is only in recent years that the LEO story has gained trac-
tion, rather than being merely a footnote in the recorded 
history of IS, and some key accounts of the early stages of 
the information age fail to mention it all – for example 
Beniger’s (1989) ‘The Control Revolution’ – or give it a 
mere passing mention – for example, Campbell-Kelly’s 
(2004) ‘A History of the Software Industry’.
Readers interested in further resources relating to the 
early UK computer industry should refer to the aptly titled 
journal ‘Resurrection’, the journal of the Computer 
Conservation Society (CCS). This is a joint venture by the 
British Computer Society (BCS), The National Museum of 
Computing (TNMOC) at Bletchley Park, and the London 
Science Museum. The BCS has links with The LEO 
Computers Society, and one of their members, David 
Holdsworth (2016a, 2016b), has ‘resurrected LEO III soft-
ware by designing an emulator using Raspberry Pi’.5
Moreover, LEO is important not simply because it was 
the first business computer, but also because the entire pro-
ject was a pioneering one in terms of the uses of computer 
technology in a large organization. It set the scene and pro-
vided the paradigm example for much of what followed, 
encompassing lessons that continue to be important. Indeed, 
as you note below, many of these have still to be fully 
understood and transposed into effective practice. So 
perhaps we can start with your recollections of why and 
how Lyons and Co developed LEO, and then go on to dis-
cuss the ways in which an understanding of LEO, in all its 
various forms and embodiments, can help us grasp impor-
tant issues, particularly the ways in which current discus-
sions and interests may be missing key points, some of 
which were already evident in these early days, but which 
have now been overlooked or forgotten.
FL–First of all it is important to understand that when 
we were working on LEO we were in uncharted territory; if 
not exactly making it up as we went along, then certainly 
developing our skills and clarifying issues that were not 
fully understood beforehand. This was not done in any hap-
hazard sense, but we were aware that we were pioneers and 
using a computer in ways its inventors had never envis-
aged. Despite this there was little time for reflection on the 
big issues, such as the impact of computers on business 
processes and procedures. Rather we engaged in excited 
discussions on our latest technical discoveries in program-
ming techniques. There was no chance to stand back and 
contemplate the things we had learned with regards to the 
application of all this in a business setting, let alone how we 
might do things differently or more effectively in the future. 
Furthermore, the lessons that we did learn from our experi-
ences largely fell on stony ground when we sought to dis-
seminate them, at least in the initial period in the 1950s and 
1960s. Some of them are only now beginning to be fully 
understood and appreciated. Of many possible examples I 
have selected three to illustrate the point.
1. We were taught by Simmons that change was only 
worth investing in if it could be demonstrated that it 
provided a new business capability. Each LEO 
application for J. Lyons, exemplified by the teashop 
replenishment application, aimed to accomplish 
this with a range of technological, business process 
and management information innovations. Many 
LEO clients resisted the idea of radical change, 
instead opting to maintain the system as it had 
evolved over time, often with little relevance to the 
post war world, as long as the new computer tech-
nology could carry out the processes at a lower cost.
2. Innovation implies doing things in new ways, and 
that in turn implies uncertainty regarding the out-
comes both in terms of technical sufficiency and 
human behaviour. We rapidly learned that design-
ing systems even at the level of the computer pro-
gramme is not deterministic and depends on often 
unknown factors, hence the need to use an experi-
mental approach to design. Yet even today, much 
design assumes outcomes that can be predicted or 
modelled from the outset.
3. The time taken to implement a system frequently 
takes longer than our ability to forecast the changes 
in the environment the system will have to operate 
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in. The issue of planning horizons is discussed 
below.
AB–So were you and the others in the team working on the 
early LEO project – what is now called LEO I – aware of 
the unique nature of the project? Did you and your col-
leagues at the time think that the application of computer 
technology in this context was something that would have 
far wider impact, or was the main concern limited to deliv-
ering the project to Lyons?
FL–As time passed, we transitioned from a tight focus 
on making our programs work to realizing that we were 
involved in a project that was transforming the way busi-
ness practices were organized. But we need to distinguish 
the understanding we coalface workers had from the very 
different concepts, perspectives, and agendas of those who 
defined the Lyons business model and strategy, and who 
had decided to initiate the LEO project.
I can pick out typical coalface problems faced by 1950s 
programmers. One was to achieve a segment of a pro-
gramme which in operation would be completed in time to 
catch the next card or printer cycle. Shaving an instruction 
repeated numerous times in operation from a routine could 
affect the timing of an application and would be gleefully 
reported to one’s colleagues at a coffee break. Probably the 
most frequently faced problem was how to shoe-horn 
instructions into the very limited store available. Whereas a 
solution to the first problem might have been to use open 
routines, tight loops could help to fit the programme in 
store. There was always the temptation to employ the 
Pareto principle – discard the 20% of routines less likely to 
be invoked but run the risk of running into synchronization 
problems. Other coalface problems which were of constant 
concern were how to cope with emergencies, including 
computer failure in the middle of a run, emergence of 
apparent bugs in a fully debugged programme and, of 
course, data errors.
Let me say a little about what led to J. Lyons and Co 
developing LEO, and the key figures involved. Lyons had 
grown rapidly in the first half of the 20th century (Bird, 
1994, 2000; Harding, 2019). It had become Britain’s largest 
player in the food industry with a wide range of products 
and services catering for a mass market. Its growth was 
based on the quality of its products and services, including 
catering for the Royal Garden Parties at Buckingham 
Palace and at the annual Wimbledon Tennis tournament. 
But equally, senior management realized that to maintain 
growth and profitability, the company had constantly to 
review its business model and its business processes. And 
that required high-level support staff reporting to the Board 
of Directors, which was made up almost exclusively of 
members of the founding families.
AB–The company grew as an off-shoot of the tobacco 
company Salmon & Gluckstein Ltd. Its founders were 
Samuel Gluckstein who formed a partnership with his two 
sons Isidore and Montague Gluckstein. They were joined by 
Barnett Salmon, a tobacco salesman, who later became 
Samuel’s son-in-law. In the late 19th century, Montague 
Gluckstein became interested in the idea of developing 
catering services, particularly for the large exhibitions that 
were sweeping across Victorian Britain. His partners, how-
ever, were only willing to support the venture if it did not 
use the company name, as they considered such ventures 
infra dig. Montague enlisted a distant relative, Joseph 
Lyons, and so the company was named J. Lyons and Co.
FL–George Booth, the Company Secretary was one of 
the very few non-family members of the Board. Booth had 
joined as company secretary in 1890, and served until 
1950s. He and the senior managers – Salmons and 
Glucksteins – understood the necessity to recruit well-edu-
cated employees to manage the business, and not rely solely 
on management trainees taken straight from school and 
trained in the ways of J. Lyons.
Booth was instrumental in 1923 in recruiting John 
Simmons, a Cambridge graduate with a first-class degree in 
mathematics (called a Wrangler) to join the company. 
Simmons’ brief was to review all aspects of the company’s 
clerical procedures to increase the efficiency in handling 
the growing number of transactions – many of very low 
value with slim profit margins, and at the same time to pro-
vide operational and senior management with the feedback 
to manage the company effectively in its day-to-day opera-
tions and the ability to consider the viability of new initia-
tives. Simmons proved to be a key figure in the expansion 
of Lyons from a family-based company to a nationally 
dominant organization.
When I joined the company in 1951, fresh from working 
as a research assistant in the Economics Research Division 
of the London School of Economics, I was assigned to the 
Statistics Office. I worked as part of a group keeping the 
accounts of several Lyons Business units. My business 
units included the provincial bakeries and the Lyons labora-
tories. (This included, unknown to me, Margaret Thatcher 
as a member of staff.) My group was led by a junior man-
ager reporting to the member of the Board responsible for 
the business units. My job was to post all the transactions 
relating to the business units I dealt with to their cost 
accounts, highlighting any variances between actual use of 
material and labour, and the standard levels expected for 
that volume of trade. At the end of each week, the outcomes 
from all the business units dealt with by my group were 
consolidated in The White Book and presented by to the 
Board member responsible. Our manager had to point out 
variances and explain, from his own and his team’s investi-
gations, why they had occurred. He also had to provide the 
details for the particular Board member the answer to a 
range of ‘what if’ questions. These could range from the 
impact on the market, on costs and profits of, say, changing 
the recipe of cupcakes, to the possibility of introducing a 
new product line. The system, largely devised by John 
Simmons, ensured that senior management was kept abreast 
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of the performance of their business units and were pro-
vided with the resources to look at alternative courses of 
action. One notable feature was the direct communication 
between the junior manager and the responsible member of 
the Board, without the intervention of middle managers.
The recruitment of Simmons was followed some years 
later by that of Thomas Raymond Thompson, another 
Cambridge Wrangler, and other high calibre management 
trainees who played important roles in the Lyons computer 
enterprise, including Oliver Standingford, David Caminer, 
Derek Hemy, John Grover, Leo Fantl and John Barnes.
In the early 1930s, John Simmons, by now titled Chief 
Comptroller of Lyons, established the Systems Research 
Office, as a business process think tank and business pro-
cess innovator. A stream of organizational and process 
innovations followed, implementing much of the brief pro-
vided by Booth to Simmons a decade earlier. As a result, J. 
Lyons & Company gained a reputation for running a smart 
business, not only in its mainline food and catering busi-
ness but also in ancillary services such as building the bod-
ies of its fleet of vehicles and running its own laundries.
From the start, the Systems Research office looked for 
methods of automating business processes (or clerical pro-
cedures as they were then called), and carefully costing 
each process to enable management to compare on a week-
by-week basis actual costs in terms of material and labour 
used against pre-set standards. Many of the ideas were 
rooted in the concepts of Scientific Management developed 
between the end of the 19th century and start of the 20th 
century in the United States by Frederick Taylor (1911). At 
the same time, they searched for ways of simplifying proce-
dures and avoiding, where they could, the transcription of 
information from one document to another. Thus, a cus-
tomer order form became the delivery note and finally the 
invoice. The systems research staff explored a variety of 
office technology, including punch-card machines. Some of 
these technologies were then introduced more widely, but 
only after rigorous testing proved that they could and would 
lead to enhanced efficiency and/or effectiveness of the pro-
cess in question.
One important consequence of the work initiated by 
Simmons, and carried through by the Systems Research 
team, was that if there were to be improvements in effi-
ciency and effectiveness, any revised systems had in some 
way to reinvent the specific business systems. Introducing 
computers could not merely replicate the previous system, 
perhaps at a lower cost, but had to add additional value 
through what were highly ambitious redesigns of the busi-
ness process. Today, we talk about business process re-engi-
neering (BPR) as if it were a new idea devised by Michael 
Hammer (1990) a few decades ago. Lyons practised it as 
their business grew in the first half of the 20th century.
AB–This is a clear example of the people at Lyons 
understanding a key issue that others only caught up with 
much later. Hammer and others came up with the term BPR 
in the 1990s, largely a response to what they saw as a major 
threat to American economic and market dominance. In the 
1990s it was Japan that posed the most serious threat. But 
BPR became synonymous with a macho style of manage-
ment, usually associated with massive redundancies – often 
euphemistically termed ‘down-sizing’ or ‘right-sizing’. 
Hammer’s writings, such as his slogan ‘don’t automate, 
obliterate’, deliberately fostered this. In the late 1970s and 
1980s, however, Stafford Beer offered a far better mantra 
that captures the policy at Lyons in the 1950s. In ‘The Brain 
of the Firm’, Beer (1972) stated that
The question which asks how to use the computer in the 
enterprise, is, in short, the wrong question. A better formulation 
is to ask how the enterprise should be run given that computers 
exist. The best version of all is the question asking what, given 
computers, the enterprise now is. (p. 70)
Lyons was an organization that led the way in many 
aspects of organizational design, incorporation of innova-
tion, and so on. Yet by the late 1970s the company was 
losing money and was acquired by Allied Breweries lead-
ing to the formation of Allied Lyons, a step that led almost 
inevitably to its dismantling, and eventual disappearance 
by the 1990s. Perhaps they did not pay enough attention to 
the potentially barbed nature of Beer’s third question?
FL–The work of the Systems Research Office led Lyons 
to become involved with the Office Machinery Users’ 
Association (OMUA) whose membership included many 
of the largest UK companies, including of course the busi-
ness machine companies themselves. The OMUA was 
established in 1916 to investigate and propagate the use and 
potential benefits of introducing business machines into 
British industry. In 1936 it was absorbed into the Office 
Management Association (OMA), itself founded in 1932. 
Later the OMA was renamed the Institute of Office 
Management, and in 1972 it became the Institute of 
Administrative Management (IAM). As such its brief 
included defining curricula for teaching management con-
cepts and practices, and setting qualification standards. It 
continued as such until 2013 when it was purchased by a 
Management Education organization. (NB The use of 
quaint terms such as ‘office machinery’ and ‘business 
machines’.)
John Simmons played a leading role in the Institute, foster-
ing the role of computers as a business tool. He was its 
Chairman from 1938 to 1950, also President from 1944 to 
1950. Many of the early customers of LEO were members 
of the Institute and were motivated to accept computers 
influenced by the example of Lyons and the advocacy of 
Simmons. A good example was Mr Bradley, one of the top 
administrators of the Ford Motor Company at Dagenham. 
The result was that Ford UK employed LEO computers to 
run its payroll on a LEO bureau and later acquired its own 
LEO II computer well before the parent company in Detroit 
used computers for business processing (Land, 2006).
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In 1947 Simmons sent two of his lieutenants, T. R. 
Thompson (TRT as he was known) and Oliver Standingford, 
to the United States to study advances in business practice 
that may have developed during WWII, and which could 
usefully be adopted at Lyons (Caminer et al., 1998: 16–19). 
They found little to interest them in conventional business 
circles, but they did come across computers when visiting 
Professor Howard Aiken, designer of the Harvard Mark I 
electro mechanical computer. A planned visit to ENIAC had 
to be aborted but they learned about ENIAC, and its pro-
posed successor EDVAC,6 from Dr Herman Goldstine at 
Princeton University. These visits gave them the idea that 
these machines, designed as they were for technical and sci-
entific calculations, could be adapted for the kind of mass 
data processing used in the running of Lyons, offering a new 
and effective way of reorganizing the clerical procedures of 
the company. They even sketched out how a clerical proce-
dure like a payroll might be organized on a computer.
They discussed these ideas with their American hosts, 
who encouraged them to take these ideas further. Goldstine 
told them that one of the most advanced computers was at 
that time being designed and built back in England, at 
Cambridge University, by Professor Douglas Hartree work-
ing with Dr Maurice Wilkes (later Sir Maurice). Further 
impetus in this direction was provided by a visit to the huge 
Prudential Insurance Company, where they learned of the 
company’s plans to use computers for automating the pre-
mium billing of their millions of clients.
On their return to England, Thompson and Standingford 
wrote a report on their visit. They proposed that Lyons 
should acquire a computer, suggesting that such a machine 
could be used to speed up clerical processes, improve accu-
racy and, at the same time, help management make deci-
sions. They outlined several alternatives for acquiring a 
computer, but noted that at that time no computer had been 
designed for dealing with business processes involving 
large volumes of data input and output, while associated 
with relatively simple calculations. Hence, they proposed 
the alternative of Lyons designing and building its own 
device, possibly in association with a group already build-
ing computers. (NB Simmons also looked at various other 
technologies at the time – including some made by IBM, 
but this option was deemed too expensive.)
The Lyons Board accepted the proposal and sent a dele-
gation, including George Booth, to meet Hartree and Wilkes 
at Cambridge University. The meeting went well, and a pro-
posal was quickly outlined whereby Lyons would provide a 
grant of £3000 (equivalent to about £90000 in 2019)7 to the 
University, and Cambridge University would help Lyons 
design and build its own computer. Within a remarkably 
short space of time – just a few weeks – the Lyons Board 
and the University authorities enshrined the proposal in a 
contract which included the stipulation that a Lyons 
employee, Ernest Lenaerts, would join the Cambridge team, 
both to learn about Electronic Delay Storage Automatic 
Calculator (EDSAC)8 and help with its design and 
implementation (Lenaerts, 1948).9 Three weeks later, Lyons 
sent a cheque for the agreed amount to Cambridge 
University.
By 1949 when Cambridge signalled the successful oper-
ation of its EDSAC computer, Lyons confirmed its decision 
to build its own computer modelled on the EDSAC archi-
tecture. Following the advice of Maurice Wilkes, Lyons 
hired John Pinkerton, a young Cambridge research scientist 
as its head engineer tasked to lead the construction of what 
became LEO I. Pinkerton proved to be a key figure in the 
technical success of the LEO range of computers. He com-
bined a talent for innovation with a practicality that led 
from innovation to successful implementation as well as an 
ability to communicate and interact with his non-technical 
peers. His achievements were marked in 2000 with the 
launch of the annual Pinkerton Lecture by the Institute of 
Engineering and Technology (IET).10 Most fittingly, the 
first lecture was given by Maurice Wilkes.
This was a period which saw the computer industry 
world-wide start a rapid escalation. From a position that 
had seen the head of IBM, Thomas Watson, proclaim that 
the world would require only a handful of computers to 
meet all its computing needs, to the situation in which every 
large business, every University, Government Department 
and technical institute, at least in the developed world, felt 
the need to have access to computer power. From the hand-
ful predicted by Watson, the numbers escalated in the dec-
ade from the mid-1950s onwards to many thousands. 
Exploiting the opportunities opened by the power of com-
puters required a cadre of professionals ranging from engi-
neers to design, build and maintain the machines, to those 
who designed the systems, prepared the computer pro-
grammes and those who operated them. Professional insti-
tutes to create these new professions were set up in many 
countries. In America, the ACM – Association for 
Computing Machinery – as well as the existing IEEE took 
up that role. In the United Kingdom, it was the Institute of 
Electrical Engineers (IEE now IET), but more importantly, 
the BCS which sought to establish a computer profession 
akin to the medical profession. Although always influen-
tial, it never achieved the exclusivity and regulatory powers 
of the professional medical bodies, and today, many more 
computing professionals are not members of the BCS than 
have membership. Nevertheless, it is the BCS which repre-
sents the United Kingdom on the International Federation 
for Information Processing (IFIP), which itself represents 
these IT professions world-wide.
The LEO teams acquired confidence from the success of 
the Lyons applications such as the well-known Teashop 
Ordering System (Land, 1997) and were receptive to the 
notion from Simmons, Thompson and Caminer, that com-
puter applications would only add value if the existing 
business processes were rethought. But many customers 
were far more reluctant to change systems they had got 
used to and thought they understood. This difference in 
approach led to a kind of arrogance in the LEO teams, 
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which later made the take-over by English Electric (EE) 
more problematic. Many of the LEO leaders had to take 
second place to EE personnel to whom they felt themselves 
superior. The barbarians had triumphed!
AB–Can you clarify the term ‘customers’ in this 
context?
FL–I mean the senior management of customers for 
LEO. A typical example was W. D. and H. O. Wills, the 
cigarette maker – manufacturer of Wills’ Woodbines and 
Capstan Full Strength. They had developed a complex 
pricing mechanism, involving different prices for different 
classes of customer. This had become increasingly complex 
as time passed, but its rationale forgotten. LEO people 
questioned the validity of this but were rebuffed.
AB–The disappearance of LEO was then bound up with 
the sorry tale of the demise of the UK computer industry.
FL–The take-over of LEO by EE was part of an ongoing 
process of the rationalization of the fragmented UK com-
puting industry. It culminated, in 1968 in the Government-
sponsored (Ministry of Technology) merger of much of the 
British Computer Industry into ICL.11 But the rationaliza-
tion was only partial. The computer suppliers working pri-
marily for the Ministry of Defence held out against a single 
all-embracing computer company. Consequently, the 
defence computer divisions of EE (the Marconi part of EE 
LEO Marconi), Plessey, GEC12 and Ferranti were merged 
into a separate group independent of ICL. Thus, a great deal 
of expertise, especially associated with real-time control 
systems, much of it at the frontier of computer applications 
and design, was lost to ICL. I believe this held back the pos-
sibility of long-term success for ICL in particular, as its 
main competitor, IBM, covered all bases, from acting as a 
contractor to the US defence industry working on the latest 
scientific advances to serving the business community from 
the largest corporation to the corner shop. In the event ICL 
survived as an independent entity for a few decades before 
it too lost its independence as it was acquired by Standard 
Telephone and Cables in 1984. This was not a success, and 
the company was fully taken over by Fujitsu in 1998 which 
finally closed its ICL division in 2008. The other 
Government sponsored group that comprised the defence-
oriented suppliers thrived for a couple of decades and 
expanded quite considerably, but in 1985 Marconi closed 
and through the 1990s the group declined to nothing.
AB–This decline and ultimate demise of the UK comput-
ing industry in many ways parallels the histories of various 
other technologies; where the UK took an early lead, based 
on innovative breakthroughs and pioneering efforts that 
were then dissipated and squandered. The obvious example 
is TV. The ‘received wisdom’ or conventional view is that 
these failures, and the subsequent successes of the Japanese 
and particularly the US computing and electronic indus-
tries, were due to a failure to foster private sector entrepre-
neurialism. But as J K Galbraith observed ‘The conventional 
view serves to protect us from the painful job of thinking’.13 
In fact, the role of the public sector and the state is critical, 
albeit deliberately ignored or obscured, so that the entrepre-
neurialism and risk-taking of the private sector can be her-
alded and lauded. The irony is that although the US is 
regarded as the redoubt of venture capitalism and entrepre-
neurialism, many of their most successful corporations have 
benefitted enormously from state funding and support.14 
Mariana Mazzucato has pioneered research on ‘the entre-
preneurial state’ in recent years; notably including the 
example of the largely publicly-funded technological break-
throughs that were critical in the development of the iPhone 
(Mazzucato, 2013). This is not simply to engage in political 
point-scoring, but rather to emphasize the complexities 
involved in the process of innovation, and what has been 
termed the move from ‘competence’ to ‘performance’ 
(Winston, 1998). Regarding TV and commercial computing, 
the UK swallowed the myth of the value of the private over 
the public sector. It continues to do so, exemplified in David 
Cameron’s attack on the ‘enemies of enterprise’ – i.e. the 
public sector – while extolling the enterprise of the private 
sector. We have already alluded to the way in which 
Academic IS has become too intimately linked to corporate 
interests and concerns such as ‘share-holder value’, and we 
shall return to this in a later section. In the US this connec-
tion was evident from the start given that the early texts and 
university departments were termed Management 
Information Systems (MIS).
  In the UK things took a different turn, with a 
unique and bizarre British characteristic. The BCS 
may be at best only a minor presence in the UK 
computing and IT industry, but if the ‘great and 
good’ of the ICT industry did not manage to 
develop the BCS to the anticipated extent, they did 
manage to insinuate themselves into the livery 
companies of the City of London. ‘The Worshipful 
Company of Information Technologists’ was estab-
lished in 1992, complete with its coats of arms and 
Latin motto. (It is also one of the few modern liv-
ery companies with its own hall, construction of 
which was made possible by several generous 
donations, particularly one from Dame Stephanie 
Shirley, founder of F International – see below.) 
There is something ironic, and perhaps very 
British, about this; a group of people closely asso-
ciated with leading-edge technologies, with enor-
mous social, political, and economic ramifications, 
enthusiastically participating in something that 
harkens back to the guilds of the middle ages, but 
whose impact on practice (and policy) can at best 
be described as slight or even nugatory.
FL–Lyons were clearly very fortunate and prescient in 
their early recruitment, particularly since brilliant mathe-
maticians are not always the best people to develop 
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people-centred systems! Senior management at Lyons were 
something of a breed apart in their ideas about use of this 
technology, they wanted far more than speedy statements of 
profit and loss, as they understood that decisions at board 
level would be greatly enhanced with better quality and 
well-focused reports and information.
The 1947 report produced by Thompson and 
Standingford presented several options. I refer to these in 
my paper in Review: The Technical and Social History of 
Software Engineering (Land, 2015), also in my chapter 
Implementing IS at J. Lyons (Land, 1999). The best account 
can be found in Caminer et al. (1998, particularly pages 
20/21 and 337–359).
There were five options put to the Lyons board:
 • One was to provide financial support to Hartree at 
Cambridge University to pursue his work and influence 
its direction for the benefit of Lyons as a company.
 • Another was to put the idea into the hands of a large 
electrical company and leave them to exploit the 
outcome.
 • A third was to collaborate with Electronic Controls 
Inc. in Philadelphia, learning from the example of 
Prudential Insurance.
 • A fourth was to approach the British Government to 
coordinate research to retain leadership in the field.
 • The final option was to ‘build a machine in our own 
workshops drawing information and advice from 
Cambridge and Harvard Universities’.
AB–You mentioned in our discussions that one key issue 
in the immediate post-war era concerned the feasibility of 
developing a working stored-program computer. Computer 
technology had of course been enormously important in the 
war effort, but the use of the technology in wider contexts 
was altogether a different matter. The Colossus computers 
used at Bletchley Park to decode German cyphers were 
programmable but could not store the programs, instead 
requiring vast arrays of switches and plugs. These needed 
to be reset and checked every time any program was run. A 
team at Manchester produced what is now regarded as the 
first stored-program computer, using von Neumann’s model 
(the Von Neumann Architecture), but this was a very small-
scale, experimental venture designed as ‘proof of concept’ 
rather than for productive use. Von Neumann’s model 
quickly became the de facto standard, although there were 
other contenders such as the Harvard architecture, which 
used different memories for data and instructions. Von 
Neumann’s model integrated both, being developed from 
Turing’s (1936) classic paper of 1936 ‘On computable 
numbers’, which first proposed this approach.
The Wikipedia entry offers the following:
The Manchester Small-Scale Experimental Machine (SSEM), 
nicknamed Baby, was the world’s first stored-program 
computer. It was built at the Victoria University of Manchester, 
England, by Frederic C. Williams, Tom Kilburn and Geoff 
Tootill, and ran its first program on 21 June 1948
Other accounts credit EDVAC as the first stored pro-
gramme computer; EDVAC being derived from ENIAC.
Von Neumann wrote up an incomplete set of notes (First Draft 
of a Report on the EDVAC) which were intended to be used as 
an internal memorandum – describing, elaborating, and 
couching in formal logical language the ideas developed in the 
meetings. ENIAC administrator and security officer Herman 
Goldstine distributed copies of this First Draft to a number of 
government and educational institutions, spurring widespread 
interest in the construction of a new generation of electronic 
computing machines, including Electronic Delay Storage 
Automatic Calculator (EDSAC) at Cambridge University, 
England and SEAC at the U. S. Bureau of Standards.
So, the Von Neumann architecture was accidental!15
FL–But in fact both EDSAC and SEAC16 were, unlike 
Manchester’s ‘Baby’, designed to serve proper users. The 
issue of a stored program computer was resolved in 1949 
when EDSAC I was demonstrated, and Lyons then gave the 
go-ahead for developing LEO. LEO I was ready by 
November 1951.
AB–So when and how did you join the LEO team?
FL–I joined in late 1951. I had studied at LSE (The 
London School of Economics) for my first degree, and then 
became a research assistant there. In late 1951 I joined 
Lyons as a clerk in the statistics office. The first people 
recruited for the LEO team were selected from those 
already working for Lyons. Before joining LEO, all candi-
dates had to attend a one-week aptitude test, though it was 
merely called an appreciation course. We learned the rudi-
ments of computers and how such a machine could be pro-
grammed. I found the course very difficult and agonized 
over the homework we were assigned. But working through 
it with my wife, Ailsa, I managed to pass. (Ailsa Land, at 
that time a lecturer in Operational Research (OR) at LSE; 
subsequently Professor of OR at LSE.) As I remember only 
two of those attending passed; Mary Blood, later Mary 
Coombs, and myself. I was among a group of around 6 peo-
ple who were essentially the second generation, joining 
those who had pioneered LEO I. It is important to under-
stand that at this stage no-one really understood what was 
involved in recruiting people to such endeavours, and the 
recruits themselves probably had little or no idea where this 
all might lead! There was a naïve view that various techni-
cal and other skills were important, but hardly anything 
more profound. Interestingly Simmons and his colleagues 
recognized from early on that the key to understanding 
computers lay not in a facility with mathematics – though it 
was regarded as a useful rather than essential skill – but in 
a systematic approach to problem solving. It was only as 
the work progressed that people came to realize the actual 
Bryant and Land 11
skills that were relevant and essential to the project. Also, 
not everyone who was approached wanted to work on 
something as uncertain as the LEO project. For example, 
some of those gaining a position as a management trainee 
at Lyons saw this as opening the door to a promising and 
lucrative career, with excellent prospects for promotion and 
high levels of executive responsibility; why move away 
from this into an unknown area with, at best, an uncertain 
future?
AB–Were there any other women among these early 
intakes?
FL–There were very few women. The best known is 
Mary Coombs, who as Mary Blood, was the daughter of the 
Lyons Medical Officer, and herself a Lyons’ employee. She 
attended the same appreciation course as myself, and joined 
the LEO programming team just a little before I did. She 
had a degree in languages from Queen Mary College after 
attending St Paul’s school. Her story is recorded in the Oral 
History collection, Other Lives, at the British Library.17 
Another notable example was Betty Cooper (née Betty 
Newman) who became a member of the programming team 
I led. But I was not aware of any discrimination based on 
gender, and the LEO team had a handful of women amongst 
its programming staff, but they were very much a 
minority.18
AB–The entry in LEOPEDIA records that
Betty joined Lyons as a labour cost clerk in the Statistical 
Office in September 1949. In 1953 she was selected for a LEO 
appreciation course, and as a result was offered a job as a 
programmer on LEO I. Despite scepticism about what LEO 
would be able to do she accepted the offer. She worked on a 
number of applications – payroll under Mary Blood (Coombs) 
and Tea Blending under Frank Land. She gained a reputation 
as a sound and reliable programmer. She left LEO to work as a 
programmer with EverReady, (FL: itself a LEO customer), 
before leaving to start a family.19
I also found a brief sketch about Betty that, I suspect, 
encapsulates the experience of many women at the time. 
She finished her schooling, and since the family did not 
have the funds to send her to university, she joined Lyons as 
a cost-accountant. She took and passed the aptitude test for 
LEO, despite the view of many of her colleagues, who saw 
working as a programmer as form of glorified clerical 
work, and a dead-end, with particularly poor prospects for 
women. Later, following the ‘merger’ with EE, she was fea-
tured in their advertising campaign ‘Why pick a woman to 
pep up your accounting department?’ This was then fol-
lowed by the ‘leering answer’ (Abbate, 2012: 61) ‘Some of 
English Electric Leo’s best computer programmers are as 
female as anything’!
FL–The role of women in the development of computing 
has justifiably become a topic for study in its own right. 
Indeed, Marie Hicks in her book published in 2017 blames 
the exclusion of women from the higher ranks of computing 
for the decline of the British Computer industry. Dame 
Stephanie Shirley mentioned above, set up F International in 
the 1960s to allow women, often with young children, to 
develop software on a part-time basis and working from 
home. She deliberately shortened her first name and styled 
herself ‘Steve Shirley’ to circumvent gender discrimination. 
In many cases being invited for meetings with male senior 
executives who assumed she was a man, and who might oth-
erwise not have given her the time of day.
AB–Indeed, and ironically F International fell foul of a 
key UK government response to gender discrimination, the 
Sex Discrimination Act (1975), which meant that they could 
no longer recruit only women, but had to be open to anyone 
who wished to apply for employment. Shirley was also 
ahead of her time in offering employees flexible and decen-
tralized working conditions. The Wikipedia entry includes a 
quote from Ralph Dahrendorf in a BBC documentary on 
‘Has Britain a Future?’
Some answers may be found in Party Manifestos. But the real 
changes are to be found where people live and work. F 
International has several characteristics which make it a model. 
It allows people to organise their own lives; it decentralises 
management decisions; it makes effective use of modern 
technology – and of course, it is successful.20
FL–When I first joined LEO, we received no formal 
training: we basically learned on the job and were mentored 
by one of the original team. It was akin to an apprentice-
ship, but much more concentrated over a very short period. 
As the number of recruits rose – very rapidly from about 
1954/55 – it became essential to formalize the training, and 
special courses for programmers and engineers were estab-
lished. Subsequently as LEO started selling its LEO II com-
puter, courses for the staff of LEO customers became the 
norm. We still hear praise from former customers about the 
quality of these courses. Anyway, I joined the team and 
stayed until 1968, by which time LEO III had been 
developed.
LEO II was developed by 1954, at which point LEO was 
established as a subsidiary of Lyons, with Anthony Salmon, 
a member of the Lyons Board as its chairman. Setting up a 
subsidiary like LEO Computers Limited was not an unu-
sual practice at Lyons for any aspect of the organization 
that was distinct from Lyons’ main business in the food 
industry. Initially, LEO and Lyons worked closely with 
each other, but gradually, as LEO focused more closely on 
marketing its range of computers and its service bureau 
activities, the companies grew apart. At the same time, 
Lyons prioritized building successful applications to serve 
the Lyons business units rather than acting as a support as 
well as a shop window for its LEO subsidiary. The separa-
tion became more manifest when Lyons replaced one of its 
LEO computers with an IBM model. That decision created 
a good deal of resentment and some anger among LEO 
managers and staff.
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Critically in 1963, the LEO project was taken over by 
EE. Technically, it was announced as a merger of the two, 
but in all respects, it was a take-over by EE. The EE people 
were very competent technically, but the LEO team were 
far more proficient in understanding the management and 
organizational issues involved in utilizing and harnessing 
this technology.
I should add some other details regarding LEO. Even in 
its earliest LEO I phase, the technology was not used only 
by Lyons. LEO I was also the basis for a service as a bureau. 
For instance, it was used by the Met Office (Hinds, 1981) 
and was the first UK use of computers for weather forecast-
ing. It was also used by British Rail and the Ministry of 
Transport for calculating the distances between railway sta-
tions, since at that time, rail fares were meant to be based on 
the distance between departure and destination. A set of 
programmes was written to do this and run at night for sev-
eral nights. The data were needed at this time since the 
number of stations had been reduced to 5000 for technical 
reasons. (See Roger Coleman’s oral history in Professor 
Tim Greening-Jackson’s account, Greening-Jackson, 2012; 
also, John Graham Cumming at the Strata Conference on 
Big Data October 2012. This use of LEO was nothing to do 
with the Beeching cuts, which came later.21)
AB–A recent episode of the UK TV series ‘Endeavour’, 
which is set in the early 1960s, offers a stark illustration of 
the time-scale for running computer programs at the time. 
The police are trying to find an address for someone whose 
name is known, but where there are no other details. They 
are offered the chance to make use of the new computer 
system installed by the GPO22 (at that time in the UK the 
state-owned utility combining both phone and mail ser-
vices). The search parameters are entered, then modified to 
make the search faster. The operator then announces he is 
off home for a good night’s sleep as he does not expect any 
response before the morning at the earliest! Two people 
watching it with me, both under 40, could not believe that 
such a simple search could take so long.23
FL–LEO in 1955 was also used to calculate tax tables, 
which changed after each budget (announced in March of 
each year). The Department of Inland Revenue provided 
the taxation rules for each category of income tax payer, 
and the LEO people wrote the appropriate programs, allow-
ing for tax parameters to be changed at budget time. The 
Chancellor’s statement was listened to with great trepida-
tion, in case he introduced changes the programs could not 
deal with. A courier brought the new tax information to 
LEO, together with any parameter changes such as changes 
in allowances, and these were entered in the programs 
before the calculation of the tax tables. The output was then 
sent to Inland Revenue for checking and, if all correct, 
printing and distribution. The Department of Inland 
Revenue had commissioned LEO to do the tax table job in 
1953 for the 1954 budget, but ironically in 1954 there had 
been no tax changes and LEO was not required.
Another LEO I project was running systems for the De 
Havilland company who were involved in various defence 
contracts. When LEO I was being used for these, it was 
physically roped-off, with only De Havilland staff and a 
select few from LEO allowed anywhere near the machine. 
Heading their team was Maurice Bonney whose career in 
some respects is a parallel to my own, albeit starting from 
and taking a very different trajectory; his initial work was 
using LEO I for calculations on missile technology, sub-
sequently becoming chief programmer for a LEO III cus-
tomer, Renold Chains, and later moving into Operations 
Management at Nottingham University, where he pio-
neered CAD/CAM methods, eventually retiring as 
Emeritus Professor.
Extract from Neville Lyons (FL: A distant 
relative of Joseph Lyons, who gave his name 
to J. Lyons & Co. Neville has no direct links 
to LEO, but is interested in the history of 
Lyons, and is an active member of the LEO 
Computers Society.)
Bureau Applications Commence
News of this ‘electronic brain’ spread throughout many 
industries and government departments and was received 
enthusiastically. Lyons soon organised a bureau, 
commissioned to perform a range of tasks on LEO. In fact, 
LEO undertook the first recorded bureau job on any 
computer in the UK; quite remarkable considering this was 
a prototype model! This task was on behalf of the Ordnance 
Board who were given facilities for carrying out ballistic 
computations. The work was shrouded in secrecy at the 
time, but it was later revealed that the calculations performed 
by the programming team were associated with the 
trajectories of the Black Knight rocket.
Another large and more complex calculation job for the 
defence industries was undertaken on behalf of De Havilland 
and later revealed to be for simulations of the guidance system 
for the Blue Streak missile. One of the LEO team, Derek 
Hemy, who had a high security clearance having worked on 
Signals Intelligence during the war, did not become aware of 
its purpose until after he had left Lyons!
In 1955, after the Chancellor’s budget speech, a courier 
delivered to Cadby Hall the parameters of the new taxation. 
All other work had to be taken off the machine while LEO 
processed new tax tables overnight for delivery to Inland 
Revenue the following morning, a process that had previously 
taken weeks by hand. For the British Transport Commission, 
LEO worked out the distances between each of the 7000 
goods depots, for the purpose of rationalising charges. This 
was the longest program and had to be performed over many 
evenings covering 18 months when LEO was not otherwise 
engaged. Had the job been undertaken manually, it was 
estimated that 50 clerks would have taken five years to 
complete it!24
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FL–As I mentioned earlier, one feature which made 
LEO stand out from the way other commercial organiza-
tions deployed computers was the level of ambition of the 
applications. A good example is the teashop ordering job 
rolled out in 1953 by the LEO team led by David Caminer; 
this was long before online technology became available.
AB–some further details about LEO and the ways in 
which it developed, illustrating the ways in which LEO 
computers and the various applications programmed to run 
on the hardware encapsulate some of the key developments 
in the use of IT in the post-war period.
Several of the LEO I projects are referred to in your 
chapter (Land, 1999), also in the section in Mike Hally’s 
book (based on his Radio 4 programme, and then published 
as Hally, 2003). Later models, such as LEO III were in 
competition with the IBM 360, which became a standard 
for 1960s business computing. LEO III used transistors and 
incorporated micro-programming, based on the work of 
Wilkes in the early 1950s – he coined the term ‘micropro-
gramming’ (Wilkes, 1951). In what became a seminal 
paper, he described an implementation of a control store 
using a diode matrix. Importantly, LEO III permitted a high 
degree of multiprogramming at a more advanced level than 
its competitors.
LEO III launched in 1961 and Caminer claimed that it 
was 2 to 3 years ahead of the IBM 360. The Post Office 
(GPO) was the best customer for LEO III, using a network 
of LEO 326s. The Wikipedia entry for LEO, largely derived 
from the LEO Computers Society website, has several 
details about the LEO III and 326.25 LEO 4 was planned, 
but never built.
Once you had joined the LEO team, how were you 
brought up to speed to contribute to these various projects? 
I assume you had no experience with computers, hardware 
or software.
FL–All new members were assigned to a mentor. I was 
fortunate in being assigned to work with Derek Hemy, per-
haps the best programmer I have ever met. My first job was 
working on checking his code. The team also learned a 
great deal from Wilkes and his colleagues in Cambridge. 
For example, we learned about the Cambridge range of 
mathematical subroutines, as well as the basic systems soft-
ware such as the ‘initial orders’.
Other key figures in these early days were John Grover, 
Leo Fantl and David Caminer.26 Fantl was a refugee from 
Czechoslovakia, escaping as a 15 year old on one of the 
kinder-transports. He later enlisted in the RAF where 
among other things he gained some familiarity with elec-
tronics. At Lyons he worked in the Planning Department, 
and when the LEO team were looking for new member, 
they learned about his background and recruited him. Some 
of his early projects included the production of PAYE27 tax 
tables, and also calculating the errors that arose from binary 
arithmetic operations.
AB–I found an obituary on his death in 2000 where 
Fantl was described as ‘The Father of Business Computing’.
FL–I am afraid there were quite a few fathers. Just 
another example of myth making. Leo Fantl was signifi-
cant, but his most important contributions were his under-
standing of the importance of recognising rounding errors 
and their impact, and later in establishing LEO in South 
Africa.. . .
AB–The foregoing offers important insights into a 
ground-breaking era; adding further detail to your own 
writings, the work of the LEO group in general, and 
extended accounts such as those by Ferry (2003), Hally 
(2003), and Harding (2019). This should have whetted the 
appetite for readers keen to know more, also prompting 
others to offer their own accounts. All in keeping with your 
determination to ensure that the history – or histories – of 
these critical developments are articulated and made 
widely available. At this point, however, we need to move 
on to your subsequent activities as one of the founding fig-
ures of the IS Academy.
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Notes
 1. More details are available from his oral history in the 
British library ‘Other Lives’ series – http://sounds.bl.uk/
Oral-history/Science/021M-C1379X0017XX-0001V0
 2. One of the primary objectives in presenting an oral history 
based on a single – albeit highly regarded and notable – per-
son’s recollections is to engender responses and prompt criti-
cal insights from others who can complement, supplement 




 4. Follett’s work has been largely overlooked, rarely appearing 
in collections on classic management writings and the human 
relations approach: yet another example of the ways in which 
women are all too readily written out of history.
 5. Other links and materials can be found at the LEOpedia site 
– see http://www.leo-computers.org.uk/–In November 2018, 
the Lottery Heritage Fund in the United Kingdom recognized 
the importance of LEO, awarding funds to a joint project 
between the LEO Computers Society and the Cambridge 
Centre for Computer History, aiming to preserve and dis-
seminate the lessons of the LEO projects and experiences. 
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Further recognition of the part played by LEO is the granting 
of a fund by the Heritage Lottery Fund to a joint venture by 
the LEO Computers Society and the Cambridge Centre for 
Computer History for the collection and archiving of LEO 
artefacts and memories, and the presentation of the LEO 
story to the public at large.
 6. ENIAC Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer’ 
EDVAC Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer
 7. One reviewer asked for amounts in £sterling to be converted 
to US dollars, but readers need to be aware that this can be 
complicated since the exchange rate between the two cur-
rencies was US$4 = £1 in the 1940s, and is now around 
US$1.2 = £1. £3000 in the late 1940s was equivalent to 
US$12000, which equates to US$125,000 in 2019. £90000 
is now worth around US$110,000 at current exchange rates 
– so in this case, there is only a moderate discrepancy.
 8. Electronic delay storage automatic calculator https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_delay_storage_automatic 
_calculator
 9. Lenaerts had been a clerk at Lyons before the War but had 
been trained on radar while serving in the RAF.
10. Institute of Engineering and Technology – https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinkerton_Lecture
11. International Computers Limited see https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/International_Computers_Limited
12. The General Electric Company see https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/General_Electric_Company
13. Ironically this phrase is now part of the conventional wisdom 
– quoted by many and referred to on many Internet sites – its 
original context now forgotten!
14. The Japanese in the 1980s, and the Chinese currently, also offer 
significant state funding and support to their digital industries.
15. The phrase ‘accidental empires’ springs to mind, taken from 
Cringley’s essays on Silicon Valley (Cringley, 1992)
16. Standards Eastern/Electronic Automatic Computer – see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEAC_(computer)
17. The Wikipedia entry for Mary Coombs can be found at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Coombs. Her father, 
William Blood, was the aptly named – or perhaps not 
– medical officer for J Lyons. Her story is recorded in the 
Oral History collection, Other Lives, at the British Library. 
http://sounds.bl.uk/related-content/TRANSCRIPTS/021T-
C1379X0017XX-0000A0.pdf
18. A large number of women had been employed at Bletchley 
Park, mostly in important auxiliary roles, rather than cypta-
nalysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Bletchley_
Park. In the USA Grace Hopper played a very important role in 












26. See the LEOpedia site – http://www.leo-computers.org.uk/
27. Pay As You Earn – the UK system for deduction of tax from 
one’s income at source, as opposed to alternative systems 
where the tax is calculated at the end of the tax year.
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